Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion by Larry Lang et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ASSET SALES, FIRM PERFORMANCE,





Working Paper No. 454




We are grateful for useful comments from David Brown, Gailen Rite, Ravi Jagannathan,
Michael Jensen, David Mayers, Robert McCormick. Craig Lewis, Ieffiy Netter, Tim Opler
Eli Ofek, an anonymous referee, participants at seminars at Clemson University, New York
University, the University of Michigan, the WFA meeting in San Francisco, the A?A
meetings in Anaheim, and especially Harry DeAngelo. This paper is part of NBER's research
programs in Asset Pricing and Corporate Finance. Any opinions expressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NEER Working Paper #4654
February 1994
ASSET SALES, FIRM PERFORMANCE,,
AND THE AGENCY COSTS OF
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
ABSTRACT
We argue that management sells assets when doing so provides the cheapest funds to
pursue its objectivesratherthan for operating efficiency reasons alone. This hypothesis suggests
that (1) firms selling assets have high leverage and/or poor performance, (2) a successful asset
sale is good news and (3) the stock market discounts asset sale proceeds retained by the selling
firm. In supportofthis hypothesis, we find that the typical firm in our sample performs poorly
before the saie and that the average stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive only when the
proceeds are paid out.
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Existing empirical evidence shows that asset sale announcements are associated with
positive stock-price reactions. Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (1984), Hue, Owers and
Rogers (1987) and Jam (1985) document significant average abnormal returns between 0.5% and
1.66%. A theory advanced in the literature to explain this empirical evidence, most explicitly by
Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987), is that asset sales promote efficiency by allocating assets to
better uses and sellers capture some of the resulting gains. With this view, which we call the
efficient deployment hypothesis of asset sales, firms only manage assets for which they have a
comparative advantage and sell assets as soon as another firm can manage them more
efficiently.
In this paper, we provide empirical results inconsistent with the efficient deployment
hypothesis and advance an alternative explanation for asset sales consistent with our new results.
First, we show that firms selling assetstend to be poor performers and/or have high leverage. In
particular, for our sample, median net income normalized by total assets is insignificantly different
from zero in the year before the sale, even though we exclude from the sample bankrupt finns
and firms in default. This result suggests that the typical firm selling assets is motivated to do
so by its financial trouble rather than by the discovery that some other firm has a comparative
advantage in operating the assets. Second, contrary to the efficient deployment hypothesis, we
find that the stock-price reaction to successful asset sales is strongly related to the use ol the
proceeds. In our sample, the stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive for those firms
expected to use the proceeds to pay down debt but negative and insignificant for firms which are
expected to keep the proceeds within the firm.
We argue that our results are inconsistent with the efficient deployment hypothesis
because asset sales are undertaken by management which pursues self-serving objectives and
1views asset sales as a source of funds. We call this alternative hypothesis the financing
hypothesis of asset sales and show that it is supported by our empirical results. If management
values firm size, diversification or its reputation, one expects it to be reluctant to sell assets for
efficiency reasons alone.' For such management, a more compelling motivation to sell assets is
that asset sales provide funds when alternative sources of financing are too expensive,possibly
because of agency costs of debt or because information asymmetries make equity sales
unattractive. With this view, the completion of an asset sale is good news about the value of the
asset because if the value of the asset had turned out to be low, the sale would not have taken
place. Moreover, when agency costs of managerial discretion are high, one expects the market
to discount proceeds of asset sales retained by the firm.
Section 2 provides a theoretical analysis of the information content of asset sales.Section
3 presents our sample of large asset sales andreports the characteristics of the firms in our
sample. Section 4 shows that abnormal returns associated with asset saleannouncements differ
substantially between firms that have performed poorly and use the proceeds torepay debt and
those that do not. Section 5 uses cross-sectionalregressions to explore the robustness of our
main results. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
SectIon 2. The Information content of assetsales.
Part 2.1 discusses the information content ofasset sales in the absence of agency costs.
Part 2.2 presents the financing hypothesis.Finally, part 2.3 collects our testable hypotheses and
relates them to the existing empirical evidenceon asset sales.
Boot (1992) and Weisbach (1993)argue that management postpones asset sales because
abandoning an unsuccessful strategy impacts the market'sassessment of managers' ability.
Weisbach (1993) shows that divestituresare concentrated around management changes.
22.1. The efficient deployment hypothesis.
We assume in this subsection that: (Al) management maximizes shareholder wealth, (A2)
the transaction costs of selling assets are greater than those of issuing new securities, and (A3)
low risk debt financing is available. tMth these assumptions, management sells an asset if the
price the purchaser is willing to pay exceeds the asset's value in its current use. A firm may learn
over time that it is not well-suited to operate an asset and seek to sell it or some other firm may
find out that it could operate the asset more profitably and attempt to buy it.
With our assumptions, an asset sale announcement has a positive stock-price reaction
if, before the announcement, the market has an unbiased estimate of the asset's value in its
current use and investors are surprised by the announcement that the asset is worth more to
somebody else. The stock-price reaction for a spedruc sale could be negative because the market
is disappointed with the price fetched by the asset. If investors know that the finn is trying to sell
an asset, however, the expected stock-price reaction is zero if the market's expectation of the sale
price is unbiased, If a firm knows that other firms can obtain greater cash flows from an asset and
the market for assets is competitive, it will sell the asset even if it finds out that the asset is worth
less than expected because the asset is nevertheless worth more outside the firm. Finally, with
the efficient deployment view, the use of the proceeds does not matter unless itconveys
information about the availability of positive NPV projects. In this case, retention of the proceeds
is good news because management which maximizes shareholder wealth wouldpay out the
proceeds if it did not have positive NPV projects available.
2.2. The financIng hypothesis.
We now consider the case where a firm is trying to raise funds to pursue managerial
objectives which need not be consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. We assume that
3the firm cannot sell low risk debt because it has high leverage and/or poor performance.
Outsiders know that the fimi wants to raise funds. Such a firm may find it expensive to use the
capital markets for at least three reasons. First, it may face the underinvestment problem
described by Myers (1977) or the asset substitution problem analyzed by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). Second, raising outside funds may be costly because of the adverse selection costs
modeled by Myers and MajIuf (1984). Third, the cost of outside funds may be high because of
agency costs of managerial discretion. In particular, if management may use funds to pursue
objectives of doubtful value to capital providers, they require a higher promised rate of return or
restrictions on the use of funds.
For management, asset sales may provide a source of funds preferable to capital markets
even with high transaction costs. First, informational asymmetfles may be less important for the
asset the firm wants to sell than for the firm as a whole. Second, selling an assetmay avoid the
recapitalization costs that would have to be paid to raise funds on capital markets if the debt
overhang is large. Third, if management pursues its own objectives, selling an asset provides
kinds with potentially fewer restrictions on managerial discretion.
If a firm sets out to sell an asset to obtain cheaper funds thanon capital markets, it may
fail. With uncertainty about the asset's value to outsiders, the saleprice the firm can obtain after
shopping the asset may be too low to justify selling it. This could be because the asset isworth
too little to outsiders relative to its value in its currentuse. Alternatively, as emphasized by
Shleiler and Vishny (1992), the market for an assetmay not be liquid1 so that a quick asset sale
may require a large discount. 1-lence, if the firm succeeds In selling the asset ata price which
makes the transaction worthwhile, this isgood news about the asseEs value even if it is known
that the firm wants to sell the asset. This is incontrast to the efficient deployment view where
planned sales always take place and hence theircompletion conveys no news on average.
4If the intended use of the proceeds is a positive NPV project for the shareholders and iF
the firm does not have a more advantageous source or funds, a successful asset sale means that
the firm can carry out the positive NPV project with the cheapest funds. For a rum in distress, this
project might be to pay back debt to avoid default. Alternatively, For a firm suffering from the
undednvestment problem, it may mean taking advantage of a valuable Investment opportunity.
Hence1 For firms with good projects for which an asset sale offers the cheapest financing, the
announcement of a successful asset sale is good news about the ability of the firm to invest.
For some firms, however, the proceeds from the sale could be put to uses that do not
increase shareholder wealth. In this case, the good news about the value of the asset sold is
tempered or negated by the market's expectation that some of the proceeds will be wasted by
management. For instance, a finn with core operations that suffer massive losses and should be
changed dramatically may sell assets to finance these losses to avoid making necessary
changes. Hence, for firms where agency costs of managerial discretion are important, the stock
market views asset sales where the proceeds are paid out to debtholders or shareholders more
favorably than those where the proceeds are kept within the finn.
So far, we have assumed that the stock market knows that management lacks funds to
pursue its objectives. If this is not the case, the first announcement concerning an asset sale can
convey information about the firm's financial health. This effect is similar to the one discussed by
Miller and Rock (1985) for the case where a firm sells securities. In this case, since the firm would
not be raising funds if its earnings were higher or if it could get attractive terms on financial
markets, the first announcement regarding an asset sale provides negative information about the
firm's financial situation unless it is accompanied by news about valuable investment opportuni-
ties.
52.3. Testable hypotheses.
We can summarize our hypotheses and their empirical implications as follows:
1. Efficient deployment hypothesis. a) Unanticipated asset sales improve shareholder
wealth on average. b) Proceeds retained by the fum are discounted by the stock market.
2. FInancIng hypothesis. a) Firms sell assets when doing so Is the cheapest source oF
funds given managemenrs objectives. In particular, asset sales take place for firms that cannot
raise funds cheaply on capital markets. e.g.. highly levered andior poorly performing firms. b)
Successful asset sales convey good news about the value of the assets sold. c) With significant
agency costs of financial discretion, the market discounts the proceeds from asset sales retained
by the firm. With the financing hypothesis, a potential confounding effect is that the asset sale
may reveal information about the financial situation of the firm or about investment opportunities.
The financing hypothesis has no implications about the relative efficiency of the buyer and
the seller in operating the asset sold. Hence, it does not preclude that the asset soldgoes to a
user with a comparative advantage in operating it. With the efficient deployment view, however,
management always compares the productivity or assets under its control to the productivity the
assets would have if sold and sells an asset whenever it loses its comparative advantage in
operating it. Hence, management's reluctance to sell assets (see Boot (1992) and Weisbach
(1993)) is evidence against the efficient deployment view. Wth the financing hypothesis,
management is pushed to sell assets by the firm's financial situation. Assets are not sold for
efficiency reasons alone, so that managers of some firms keep assets for which the firms have
no comparative advantage and make no attempt at selling them as long as the firm's financial
situation is good enough. Obviously, in somecases, the firm's financial situation Is such that it
becomes an attractive takeover target, which leadsmanagement to sell assets it operates
inefficiently so that it can retain its position.
6With theefficient deployment view, the use of the proceeds should not matter. In contrast,
withthefinancing view, proceeds paid out to debtholders or shareholders are valued more if
agency costs of managerial discretion are significant. The only empirical evidence we know of that
distinguishes among uses of proceeds is provided by Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) and
Meyers and Singh (1993). Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) focus on a sample of finns in
severe distress, most of them in default. They find that asset sales where the proceeds are used
to pay back creditors affect shareholders adversely, indicating that, for firms In default, asset sales
are made to benefit creditors rather than shareholders.
Meyers and Singh (1993) look at announcements of asset sale programs as well as at
announcements of completed asset sales. When a firm announces that it Intends to sell assets,
there is lithe or no infon'nation released about the sale price of assets. Hence, outsiders mostly
learn that the firm wants to raise funds and the proposed use of the funds. Mayers and Singh
(1993) find that the proposed information is important to the stock market. They find a large
positive stock-price reaction when the firm announces that it intends to use the proceeds to
finance a stock repurchase; a positive significant announcement effect when the firm intends to
re-invest the proceeds and a negative effect when the firm intends to repay debt The magnitudes
of the effects they observe seem to be similar to the stock-price reaction one would observe if
these announcements were not accompanied by the announcement of asset sale programs: stock
repurchase announcements have large positive effects, announcements of investments have
small positive effects, and announcements of leverage decreases have small negative effects.2
At the time of the completion of the sale, the market learns only that the sales price is large
enough for the sale to succeed since the firm announced earlier the Intended use of the
2 See Mcconnell and Muscarella (1985) for a study of announcements of investments and
Smith (1986) for a review of the stock-price reactions to financing announcements.
7proceeds. One would therefore expect the sales announcement effect to be positive when firms
announce the completion of an asset sale, which is what they find.
Section 3. CharacteristIcs or large asset sales and of the fIrms that make them.
Section 3.1. The sample.
In this paper, we investigate asset sales reported to the SEC in BK forms as identified
through the NEXIS database.3 NEXIS reports all 8K filings from October 1988 but only selected
abstracts are included from 1985 through October 1988. The UK form requires that theregistrant
furnish specific information if it or "any of its majority-owned subsidiaries hasacquired or disposed
or a significant amount of assets, otherwise than in the ordinary course of business."Hence, asset
sales reported in BK loans are ideally suited to address the issues raised in thispaper since the
firm deems the sale to be both significant and unanticipated.
We identity 151 asset sales taking place from 1984 to 1989 for firmsfor which data is
available on the Compustat files. We want to study voluntary asset salesand therefore eliminate
firms that are in default, in a corporate controlcontest, in voluntary or involuntary liquidation or
have filed for reorganization under Chapter 11. Further,we omit all asset sales of less than $ I
million. Finally, we eliminate all firms for which stockreturns could not be found on the CRSP files
for NYSE and AMEX stocks. Of the 151asset sales, 93 sales made by 77 firms satisfy our
additional criteria. The Appendix provides detailedinformation on each sale in our sample; the
reader can refer to this appendix when we mentionspecific sales in our discussion. The average
number of asset sales per year(15.3) in our sample is substantially smaller than in the Jam
(1985) sample, but substantially larger than in theAlexander, Benson and Kampmeyer (198.4) and
Hit., Owers and Rogers (1987) samples. Weuse as the announcement date the eatiiest of the
'The NEXIS search used thekey words "asset' within 10 words of "sale" and "divestitures?
8following three dates: (1) the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcement date (44 cases); (2) the
Dow Jones News Retileval Service announcement date (25 cases); (3) the agreement date as
reported by the 8K filing (24 cases).
Since we are interested in the differences between firms expected to pay out the proceeds
and those that are not, we use information From the 8K filings, annual reports, the S&P Standard
Stock Reports and the WSJ to determine why the asset was sold and how management expects
to use the proceeds. The sample has 40 asset sales by 35 firms with proceeds paid out to
creditors and/or shareholders and 53 sales by 43 firms (one firm makes one sale of each type)
with proceeds retained by the firm. We call this sample 0(40 sales the "payout sample." and the
sample of 53 sales the "re-invest" sample throughout the paper. For 22 asset sales by 18 firms
where the proceeds are paid out, information about the use of the proceeds is given by the 6K
filing or the press articles contemporaneous with the announcement Of these 22 sales, there are
12 cases where the source for the announcement date is the WSJ or the Dow-Jones Wire and
the use of funds is given in the WSJ and 4 cases where the announcement date is the date of
the 8K filing and the 8K form gives the use of funds. Though we generally focus on the 40 asset
sales where the proceeds are paid out, we report confirming abnormal returns evidence for these
16 sales in table 5 since they correspond to our cleanest subsample where investors learn
simultaneously about the sale and the use of the proceeds. For the other 18 asset sales where
the proceeds are paid out, our sources describing the use of funds are not contemporaneous with
the sale announcement. These sources are the annual report (12 times), an 8K filing subsequent
to the announcement date (4 times) or the S&P Standard Stock Reports (2 times).
In general, we rely on the full sample of firms paying out the proceeds because we
presume that investors have rational expectations at the time of the asset sale announcement,
in the sense that, on average, they expect the proceeds to be paid out when a subsequent
9announcement to that effect is made. To the extent that the probability that such a statement will
be made is less than one, the effect of the planned use of the proceeds on the announcement
of the sale is reduced and our tests are len powerful. There is no noticeable difference for the
source of the announcement date between the sample of firms that pay out the proceeds and the
sample of firms that do not. In both samples, roughly 75% of the observations come from the
Dow-Jones Wire and the WSJ. Hence, the difference in the stock-price reactions between the two
samples cannot be attributed to a difference in how investors leam about the event.
If the financing hypothesis applies to the sales in our sample, one would expect the
proceeds paid out to be used to pay down debt rather than to distribute cash to shareholders. If
a firm is excessively levered in managements eyes, management has a strong motivation to sell
assets to reduce leverage and avoid possible costs of financial distress. In contrast, if most
proceeds were used to pay dividends to shareholders in the absence of pressures from the
market for corporate control, one would view this evidence as consistent with the absence of
agency costs of managerial discretion and supportive of the efficient deployment hypothesis
where management pays out to shareholders funds it cannot invest profitably within the firm. We
have only five cases where there is evidence that management plans to pay some of the
proceeds to shareholders: Allied-Signal, Culbro Corp, Federal Mogul, Koppers Co. and Union
Carbide. Since we have only five observations where shareholders receive some of the proceeds
directly, there is little we can say in this paper about the stock-price reaction difference between
paying the proceeds to shareholders and using the proceeds to pay down debt. Although we
include these observations in the payout sample, the results in this paper do not depend on these
five observations.
Even though there is no indication that management expects to pay out part of the
proceeds to shareholders, there could still be an indirect connection between asset sales and
10payouts to shareholders. For instance, management could sell assets to replenish liquid assets
used for repurthases or to repay debt incurred to finance share repurchases; altematively, It could
change its mind about the use of the proceeds after the sale and repuchase shares. A careful
reading of the case histories provided In the appendix shows that the evidence in favor of an
indirect connection is limited. After the sale, only two firms not paying out proceeds. John Fluke
and Varo Inc., announce that they will undertake a stock repurchase. For 10 firms paying out
proceeds, there are repurchase announcements In the year before the sale. Six of these
repurchases are targeted repurthases where the company buys out a major shareholder, which
raises suspicion of entrenchment.
There is some indication, though, that dividend payments may be affected by asset sales
in our sample. Irrespective of the use of the proceeds, approximately twice as many firms
increase dividends in the year after the sale as they do in the 12 months before the sale (5
relative to 3 for firms that pay out proceeds and 11 relative to 5 for those that do not). Two firms
that pay out the proceeds decrease dividends in the 12 months before the sale and one in the
following 12 months; in contrast. 3 firms that retain the proceeds reduce dividends in the year
before the sale and one in the year following.
In our sample. finns provide a number of different reasons for selling assets. In some
cases, they sell assets explicitly to reduce debt. In other cases, they give other reasons to sell
assets but still pay out the proceeds. If a firm sells an asset and pays out the proceeds, though,
the asset sale typically reduces the finn's diversification and If the asset is an unrelated division
It necessarily does so. Hence, to understand the effect on shareholder wealth of the motivation
of a sale, it is better to focus on the case where the proceeds are retained by the firm so that the
effect is not confounded by the disbursement of proceeds effect. For the 53 sales made by firms
which do not plan to pay out the proceeds, the following reasons to undertake the sales are given
11for at least five sales in our sample:
1. FocusIng on core businesses. For instance, Warner Communications Inc sold
Franklin Mint in 1984 because this business was not part of Its core businesses. In total, we have
15 firms (21 asset sales) where this motivation is prevalent.
2. SellIng unprofitable or slow-growing businesses. An example of this would be the
sale of United inns inc's car wash business in 1988 for $ 17 million. Thirteen firms (14 asset
sales) fit this explanation.
3. To finance acquisItions or expansion. Primark Corp soid its TVleasing business for
$ 37.9 million in 1988 to generate cash for a pending acquisition. This explanation seems
appropriate for 6 firms (9 asset sales).
With the financing hypothesis, asset sales by finns focusing on core operations or selling
unprofitable operations have a different impact on shareholder wealth depending on whether the
proceeds are retained by the finn or not For instance, it could be that a firm chooses to sell
assets to finance losses on core businesses and postpone value-increasing changes in these
businesses, in which case the proceeds of asset sales made to focus on core activities would be
discounted by the stock market Later, we provide evidence that ass!t sales made to focus on
core activities or to shed unprofitable businesses do not significantly Increase shareholder wealth
in our sample when the proceeds are retained by the firm.
It is noteworthy that many companies seem to sell assets while engaged in a program of
acquisitions so that the asset sales provide cash for these programs, even though management
may motivate the asset sale using different considerations, such as eliminating unprofitable
divisions or focusing on core activities. These cases are certainly consistent with the view that
management might be raising funds to pursue its own objectives. An example of such a sale is
the sale by Canal Capital Corp of its stockyard business for dose to $ 7 million in 1989. The
12annual report mentions that the stockyard business was not pmfitable but at the same time the
firm had moved (according to its annual report) from a stockyard firm to a diversified firm
interested in real estate development, trading securities and investing in ancient arti
Section 3.2. FIrm characteristics.
In table I • we provide data on the 93 asset sales and the firms that made them for the full
sample and also on the basis of the use of the proceeds. In the following analysis, we discuss
how the characteristics of firms that pay out the proceeds differ from those of other firms.
Although we report both means and medians, we focus on the medians because the sometimes
large difference between means and medians indicates that the distribution of the variables is not
symmetric and hence the medians are likely to be more informative about the typical sample firm.
The median asset sale in our sample represents 23% of the value of the selling firm's equity.
There is a significant difference (at the 0.01 level) between the median sale proceeds as a
fraction of the equity value for firms that pay out proceeds (42%) and the other firms (13%). We
investigate later whether the difference In abnormal returns between finns that pay out proceeds
and those that do not Is due to differences In the magnitude of the sale relative to equity and find
that this is not the case. The difference in the size of the sale relative to equity Is partly due to
the fact that the median market value of equity for the firms that retain the proceeds is higher than
for the firms that do not. There is no significant difference, however, between the median book
values of total assets of the two groups of firms. Finally, we report the average accounting gain
or loss on sale, which turns out to be small for the typical firm irrespective of the use of the
proceeds.
Finns in the payout sample have a lower average and median interest coverage ratio than
firms in the re-invest sample. The median coverage ratio of firms that pay out the proceeds Is
13Table I
Firm characteristics for a sample of 93 sIgnificant asset sales
The sales are obtained from inspection of 8K forms. Managerial ownership is obtained from
proxy statements. The accounting loss on the sale is from the 8K form. All other data is
obtained from Compustat and CRSP tapes. The Compustat data is from the year preceding
the asset sale. The market value of equity is for 6 days before the announcement date. ,
denote significance of the t-test for the difference in the means between the two
subsamples at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively (in parentheses we report the
significance level for the median test). _________________ _________________












Panel A. Asset sale characteristics.
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1.56, indicating that for the typical firm earnings exceed interest payments by 56%. In contrast,
the median coverage ratio for the other firms exceeds 3. Hence, the typical firm paying out the
proceeds is dose to being unable to pay interest out of earnings. This suggests that firms paying
down debt may have a powerful motivation to sell assets, providing evidence consistent with the
financing hypothesis.
For the whole sample, the average ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to
the book value of total assets, 0.31, is larger than the average ratio reported in Bernanke and
Campbeli (1988) for the 1986 universe of Compustat firms (0.28), providing some evidence that
our sample firms have above-average leverage. Using the ratio of the book value of long-term
debt to the book value of total assets, there is no difference between the firms that intend to pay
15out the proceeds and the others using the median lest. There is also no evidence that firms
paying out the proceeds have significantly more short-term debt or short-term liabilities. However,
the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets is significantly higher for firms that pay
out the proceeds for the mean and the median.
The firms in the sample perform poorly before the sale. Their average net income is
negative and their median net income is trivially small. Their cumulative net of market return over
the preceding year is negative. Finally, their Tobin's q is low. Moreover, the performance of firms
paying out the proceeds Is significantly worse than the performance of the other firms at the 0.05
level when measured by net income to total assets. In addition, the firms that pay out proceeds
typically lose money in the year before the sale. Cumulative net of market returns for the year
prior to the sale are also lower for these firms at the 0.05 level. Finally, the firms in the payout
sample have a significantly lower Tobin's q ratio indicating that the firms that retain the proceeds
have better investment opportunities. For the firms in the re-invest sample, median net income
divided by total assets is extremely small and median cumulative net of market returnsare
positive. Median q is below one for these firms.
Though asset sales by firms in distress have been studied in a number of papers recently
(Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Brown, James and Mooradian (1993) and Ofek (1994)).
it is important to note that the firms in our sample were not selected because of distressor poor
performance. Further, as explained earlier, we removed from the sample those firms thatwere
bankrupt at the time of the asset sale announcement. Only one firm files aChapter 11 petition
lithe year following the asset sale. Seven firms defaultedon their loans or restructured their debt
lithe year before the sale; four of these firmspaid down debt from the proceeds. Two firms
renegotiated loans in the year before the sale and these two firmspaid down debt with the
proceeds. Two firms defaulted after the sale and both used theproceeds to pay down debt.
16Hence, the typical sale in our sample is not undertaken to cure a default or as part of a workout.
The median firm is. however, a poor performer whose net Income is just about zero and whose
stock price is not keeping up with the market.
There is some weak evidence that being a takeover target makes it more likely that a firm
will pay out the proceeds of an asset sale. In the 12 months preceding the asset sale, there is
evidence of takeover activity for g firms and 5 of these firms paid out the proceeds of the asset
sale. Further, there is evidence of takeover activity for 5 firms following the sale and 3 of these
paid out the proceeds.
One question of importance given our theoretical analysis is whether managers that sell
assets and retain the proceeds have fewer incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. Table 1
reports average managerial ownership for the firms that retain the proceeds and for the ones that
do not. Managerial ownership is significantly higher for finns that pay out the proceeds, so that
agency problems may be smaller in these firms because it is more costly for management to
pursue its objectives. Because of the difference in the market value of equity between firms that
repay debt and those that do not, it turns out that, although managers own a larger fraction of
shares in firms that repay debt, their dollar stake is smaller.
Section 4. The stock-prIce reaction of asset sales.
To measure stock-price reactions to asset sales, we estimate the market model from 250
to 50 days before the announcement. Table 2 reports the stock-price reactions for the full sample
and also on the basis of the use of the proceeds. Our finding for the full sample of significantly
positive cumulative returns (1.41%) for days -1 and 0 is comparable to the findings in the earlier
papers.
The stock-price reaction differs significantly between sales in the payout sample and sales
17Table 2
Avenge percentage stock-pricereaction tothe announcement cia sIgnIficant
asset sale
The abnormal returns are market model prediction errors. Day 0 Is the announcement
day. The sample comprises 93 asset sales obtained from Inspection of 81< forms. ,
denote, respectively, significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels using z-statistics.























































































18in the re-invest sample. Though those firms that payoutthe proceeds experience a significant
increase in value, the announcement of asset sales in the re-invest sample has little valuation
effect on the firms in our sample, except on day -2 where there is a significant positive effect for
these firms. To make sure that our conclusions are robust to taking into account this effect on day
-2, we later make sure that they also hold when we use cumulative returns for the period from
day -5 to day +5. -
The significantly higher announcement effect for sales in the payout sample is consistent
with the existence of significant agencycosts of managerial discretion. However, the interpretation
of the results of table 2 is rendered more difficult by the fact that firms in the payout sample
typically have poorer performance than the firms in the re-invest sample. Hence, the result in
table 2 might reflect that firms that perform poorly and sell assets have a positive stock-price
reaction irrespective of the use of the proceeds. This would be the case If for such firms, any
asset sale reduces the casts of financial distress. In this case, the results of table 2 would not be
supportive of the role of agency costs of managerial discretion for the use of the proceeds. To
investigate this, table 3 provides mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for various
subsamples of asset sales. This table confirms that the mean and median cumulative average
abnormal return for the payout sample are significantly higher than for the re-invest sample.
In all subsamples in table 3, the cumulative average return Is higher for the firms that have
some prior evidence of poor performance or financial difficulties than for the other firms. However,
for the traditional window of days -1 and 0, the difference in cumulative average returns between
the firms that have prior evidence of poor performance or financial difficulties and the other firms
is never significant (except barely so at the 0.10 level for firms that have negative news in the
WSJ). For the longer window of days -5 to +5, the mean average abnormal return is significantly
higher for firms whose WSJ announcement includes negative news, for finns with negative net
19Table 3
Cumulative percentage abnormal returns for the whole sample and various
subsamples
The cumulative abnormal returns are obtained from market model residuals; z-statistics are
given in parentheses for the means, p-values for the sign-iank test are given in square
brackets and p-values for the median test are given in curly brackets.
From day -ito day 0 From day -5 to day +5





































































































20D. Cumulative net of market return for the preceding 250 days.
Fromday-1 todayo Fromday-Stodayts





























E. Coverage ratio(EBlTllnterest payments).





























income for the year before the sale and for firms with negative cumulative net of market returns
for the year before the sale. Firms with coverage ratios lower than the sample median have
cumulative abnormal returns insignificantly different from firms with higher coverage ratios. There
is therefore no dear indication from table 3 that the higher abnormal returns of firms paying out
the proceeds are due to the fact that these firms have had greater difficulties or exhibit poorer
performance than the other firms.
Table 3 shows that there is substantial overlap between the firms that pay out the
proceeds and those that exhibit poor performance and/or financial difficulties. This overlap does
not affect the intepretation of the results for the shorter window since there the only way to split
21the sample to obtain a significant difference between abnormal returns is to divide the sample
according to the use of the proceeds. However, for the longer window, other ways of dividing the
data yield significant differences in abnormal returns. To understand better the impact of firm
performance and use of the proceeds on the stock-price reaction, we divide the sample into four
mutually exclusive groups in table 4. We define as poor performers firms with negative net of
market cumulative returns the previous year. negative net income over the previous year and/or
a WSJ sales announcement that provides some evidence of difficulties, such as negative
earnings. For the 1 1-day window, asset sales have a significant positive average stock-price
reaction only for poorly performing firms in the payout sample. This stock-price reaction is
significantly different from the other three subsamples. The same conclusion holds with the 2-day
window, except that firms paying out the proceeds and not performing poorly have a positive
significant stock-price reaction that is significandy lower than the poorly performing firms that pay
out the proceeds. Given that there are only 7 firms that pay out the proceeds and are not
performing poorly. such a result has to be interpreted with caution.
Poorly performing firms that retain the proceeds have insignificant abnormal retums on
average. Hence, the positive abnormal returns in our sample are not driven by the financial health
of firms but by the use of the proceeds. The firms in our sample that neither repay debt nor
perform poorly experience insignificant abnormal returns. The results from our sample are
inconsistent with the view that positive abnormal returns of asset sales result solely from man-
agements decision to reallocate corporate resources towards better uses within the corporation.
Instead, our evidence suggests that asset sales where the proceeds are paid out rather than used
to increase liquid assets under managerial control increase shareholder wealth. This evidence
supports the view that agency costs of managerial discretion affect the stock-price reaction to
asset sales.
22Table 4
11-day percentage abnormal returns for subsamples of asset sales
Troubled firms are firms that have negative cumulative returns for the previous
250 days, negative net income for the previous year and/or a Wali Skeet Journal
asset-sale announcement that provides some evidence of distress. For each cell,
we report the mean, the median in parentheses, the z-statistic for the mean in
square brackets and, in curty brackets, the number of observations and the
fraction of observations with a positive value. The lower right-hand cell gives the
mean difference between troubled finns that pay out the proceeds and healthy






























A concern with table 4 is that the sample of poocly performing firms inthe payout sample might
be dominated by firms that are facing immediate financial difficulties, so that the positive average
abnormal return reflects the ability of these firms to sell assets successfully and hence reduce
their financial difficulties. To investigate this possibility, we divided the sample into firms with a
coverage ratio (EBIT divided by interest payments) above the sample median and firms with a
coverage ratio below the sample median. We then compared stock-price reactions for firms with
a coverage ratio below the sample median in the payout sample and those in the re-invest
sample. We found that the 18 asset sales by firms with below-median coverage ratios in the re-
invest sample have an insignificant abnormal return that is significantly lower than the stock-price
23reaction for firms with below-median coverage ratios in the payout sample. Since the abnormal
returns for firms that pay out the proceeds do not differ between firms with above and below-
median coverage ratios, it is unlikely that the relation between abnormal returns and the use of
the proceeds depends on the selling firm's financial situation.
In table 5, we provide results for additional subsamples of interest. First, we show the
average and median abnormal returns for the sale announcements where the source for the use
of the proceeds is similar to the source for the announcement. This sample comprises sales
where the announcement is in the Dow-Jones wire or the WSJ with a WSJ stoiy that has the use
of the proceeds and where the announcement date is the agreement date from the 8K filing with
the use of the proceeds described in the BK. These 16 observations have slightly higher mean
and median returns than the 40 observations, but the z-statistic is lower and the p-value of the
sign-rank test is higher for the 16 observations than for the 40 observations, possibly because
of the smaller number of observations. Second, we show that, among the firms that do not pay
out the proceeds, there is no evidence that there are subsamples of sales with average or median
abnormal returns comparable to those of firms that pay out the proceeds when one focuses on
the shorter window. For the longer window, there is no case where the z-statistic is significant
when the firm does not pay out the proceeds, but the magnitude of the abnormal retums is fairly
high in the case of the firms that sell an unprofitable division and retain the proceeds. In contrast,
fims that sell assets to focus more on core operations but do not pay out the proceeds have very
small abnormal returns in absolute value and for the short windows both average and median
abnormal returns are negative.
24Table $
Percentage cumulative abnormal returns for additional subsamples
Cumulative abnormal returns are obtained from market residuals for a sample of
93 large asset sales obtained from 8K forms from 1984 to 1989. The subsamp-
las are constructed using information from press articles, the 8K fomi, the annual
report and the S&P Standard Stock Repoils. The simultaneous announcement
sample is the sample where the same source provides the announcement of the














































































Section 5. ExplainIng the cross-sectional variation In cumulative returns.
5.1. RelatIve proceeds and stock-price reactIon.
The efficient deployment view of asset sales does not distinguish between poorly
performing firms paying out asset sales proceeds and other firms selling assets. Since we
25document in this paper a sharp difference in the stock-price reaction between these firms, can
our evidence be reconciled with the efficient deployment view? Our evidence in table 1 shows
that firms paying out the proceeds have a significantly greater ratio of asset sale proceeds to the
market value of their equity. Hence, if the seller's gain from selling an asset, i.e.. the premium the
bidder pays for the asset in excess of the assets value when used by the seller, expressed as
a percentage of the proceeds, is the same irrespective of the firm that sells the asset, one would
expect a larger stock-price reaction for firms that pay out the proceeds. This argument suggests
that the distinction we rind could be due to the size of the proceeds relative to equity. However,
as evidenced by regressions I and 2 of table 8. there is a significant relation between the stock-
price reaction and the proceeds divided by the market value of equity, but this relation does not
explain the higher average abnormal return of the payout sample.1 Regression I is consistent with
the argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that, given the illiquidity of the market for asset sales,
large asset sales are more likely to fail. This is because, in this case, their success is better news
than the success of small asset sales.
The literature on security issues generally emphasizes that they convey information to
markets about the value of the issuing finn's securities or its assets; to the extent that asset sales
are altematives to security issues, they could also reveal information about the value of the firm's
securities or assets. This does not seem to be the case in our sample, though. This is because,
if outsiders learn about the firm's demand for funds through the asset sale, agreater demand for
funds would be bad news and the abnormal return would be negatively related to the size of the
asset sale. It is interesting to note that the positive relation between abnormal returns and the size
of the proceeds is the opposite or that obtained in the literatureon equity issues, since in that
All regressions of table 6 are estimated using weighted leastsquares, where the weight is
the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the residual of the marketmodel regression.
26Table 6
Weighted least squares regressions of the abnormal return on
firm and sale characteristics
The sales are obtained from inspection of 8K forms. Managerial ownership is obtained from
proxy statements. The accounting loss is from the 8K form. All other data is obtained from
Compustat and CRSP tapes. The Compustat data are from the year preceding the asset












































































Adjusted R2 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15
p-value for
F-test
<0.01 0.01 0.14 <0.01 0.16 <0.01
27literature some researchers find that the stock puce decrease is increasing in the size of the
issue.'
5.2. Abnormal returns and performance: A multivarlate perspective.
We investigated in section 4 the extent to which the difference in abnormal returns can
be explained by the fact that a successful asset sale is more important for the firms that pay out
the proceeds because these firms are in a poor financial situation and would face significant costs
of financial distress without the successful sale. in that section, dividing the sample according to
recent performance or the extent of financial difficulties does not lead to significant differences
between subsamples for the shorter event window, but does so for the longer event window. It
could be that our classification of firms as poorly performing or better performing firms does not
capture a relation between performance and stock-price reactions that could be captured by
regressing stock-price reactions on levels of performance measures. To investigate this, we relate
abnormal returns to net income, net of market stock returns for the past 250 days and the debt-
asset ratio In regressions 3 and 4.
The regression estimates in table 5 confirm the earlier results that the higher abnormal
return of finns using asset sale proceeds to repay debt cannot be explained by these firms having
poorer performance or a more precarious financial situation. Whereas past stock returns are
correlated with abnormal returns for the longer window, this effect does not explain why firms that
repay debt have higher abnormal returns since the dummy variable that takes value one for the
firms that pay out the proceeds is significant for both windows. Further, regressing abnormal
returns on past performance could lead to significant results when abnormal returns are estimated
See Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1990) for a review of the evidence on the
determinants of the stock-price reaction to equity issues.
28from market residuals because the intercept of the market model estimates depends onpast
performance.
Regressions 5 and 6 relate abnormal returns to net-of-market cumulative returns for the
past 250 days, Tobin's q and managerial ownership. The financing hypothesis implies that there
should be a ne9ative relation between the stock-price reaction and the degree ofagency costs.
We would expect abnormal returns to be higher for firms with higher managerialownership
(provided that management is not using its control of voting rights for entrenchment purposes).
One would expect high q firms to have lower agency costs of managerial discretion,so that the
stock market would discount sales proceeds less for these firms. For the shorter window, these
variables have no explanatory power whatsoever. For the longer window, these variables make
the dummy variable for the use of the proceeds Insignificant This is because theyare correlated
with the use of the proceeds. In a logistic regression not reported here, we find that firms with low
managerial ownership or high q are significantly more likely to retain the proceeds, so that
introducing these variables in the regression makes it more difficult to estimate the coefficient on
the use of the proceeds precisely.
Section 6. ConcludIng remarks.
In this paper, we have shown that for a sample of large asset sales thestock-price
reaction is significantly positive only for those firms that plan topay out the proceeds to
claimholders. This evidence Is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the market reactsfavorably
to asset sales simply because they lead to more efficient use of assets and theselling firm
captures some of the benefit from the increased efficiency.
Our evidence is consistent with what we call the financing hypothesis. th this
hypothesis, management sells assets to obtain funds topursue its objectives when altemative
29funding is either too expensive given its objectives or unavailable. On average. finns benefit from
announcing successful sales because a successful sale means that the firm received enough
money to make the sale worthwhile. Further, proceeds are discounted when retained by the
selling firm because of agency costs of managerial discretion. In our sample, firms selling assets
typically are poor performers and they are more likely to pay out the proceeds when they find it
difficult to service their debt. The average stock-pdce reaction to asset sales is positive and it is
significantly higher for firms that pay out the proceeds. We do not, however, find a direct link
between abnormal returns and proxies for agency costs of managerial discretion.
This paper raises some questions which should be addressed in further research. We do
not explore why managers might be reluctant to sell assets. Is it that managers do not want to
acknowledge failure or is it that complex organizations cannot change easily because of inn-firm
relationships and quid pro quos? Though we are convinced that our evidence demonstrates the
relevance of the financing hypothesis, it is also dear from our analysis and from our empirical
results that the information conveyed by asset sales is difficult to evaluate because asset sales
convey news about the value of the asset sold, the intended use of the proceeds and, possibly,
the firm's financial health. Larger samples of possibly less significant asset sales might offer a
way to disentangle these various effects with more precision and provide useful information on
the relative importance of the financing hypothesis and of the efficient deployment hypothesis.
In our analysis, we have not distinguished between payouts to shareholders and to debtholders.
The market for corporate control could force managers to sell assets for which they do not have
a comparative advantage and to pay out the proceeds to shareholders. Further research should
therefore investigate the extent to which asset sales are the result of pressures from the market
for corporate control.
In conclusion, our sample suggests that the efficient deployment hypothesis is not as
30useful as prior studies might have suggested. Perhaps one could view our evidence as showing
that firms seem more aware of their comparative advantage when they are short of funds than
otherwise. If this is the case, though, it provides further support for the view that the agency costs
of managerial discretion matter and that debt plays a useful role in disciplining management.'
'See Jensen (1988) and Stulz (1991).
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33Appendix: Brief Description of Asset Sales
The following material briefly describes the asset sales in our sample. Each sale was
reported to the SEC In an 8K filing, indicating that the sale represented a "significantamount of
assets." Information regarding each sale Is gathered from several sources, induding Annual
Reports. 8Ks, the Wall Sheet Journal, Dow Jones News Service, S&P Standard Stock Reports,
and other news sources.
The source of the date of the first public announcement of the asset sale is indicated
below in parentheses following the announcement date; DW indicates that the announcement
was in the WSJ (we used one trading day before WSJ story as the announcement date), DJ
indicates that the story was reported over the Dow Jones News Wire but was not reported In the
WS-Jonthe same or following date, Agreement date indicates that the first public date related to
the announcement was the date the sale agreement was signed, as reported in the BK.
Format of Asset Sale Information:
Seller F Buyer
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-1 ,+l) in percent / Announcement Date (Source of Announcement Date)
Pflce On millions) / Gain on Sale Qn millions)
Business of Asset Sold I Business of Buyer
Use of Funds from Sale / Code (0—strategic. 1—cash paid out of firm through debt reduction and/or stock
repurchasel I Source of information on use of funds.
Brief Details Qncluding information on payouts to stockholders through repurchases where applicable).
Adobe Resources Corp I Equitable Resources
7.06 I 861230 (DJ)
$22.4 / NA
Oil Wells & Land / Natural Gas
Reduce Debt/li Annual Report
Adobe Resources had a loss in the quarter around the sale due to lower oil prices. The asset sale occurred
at the same time the firm caVed $55 million in convertible debentures and enabled Adobe Resources to
reduce its long-term debt to zero. The flrm mentioned that the assets were not consistent with their long-
range objectives. Stock repurchase: On 880128, bought back a million shares for $12 million and may
buybeck 500,000 more. No indication of connection to asset sale.




Reduce Debt/i / BK
Airgas went public in 1986 and made several acquisitions over the following two years. This asset sale
enabled the firm to reduce borrowings under a revolving credit facility by $50 million and was consistent
with their long-term plan to emphasize gas distribution.
34Allied Signal Inc. (two sales) 1(1) Lanesborough Corp (2) Commerzbank AG
(1) -3.59 (2) 4.77 I (1) 870406 (D (2) 870325 (DJ)
(1) $479 (2) NA I All discontinued operations gave $79 million gain.
(1) Electronics (2) Electronics ((1) NA (2) NA
(1) & (2) Reduce debt, share buyback and investment In core businesses/(1) & (2) 1 / (1) & (2) Annual
Report
Allied Signal was formed by the merger of Signal Cos. and Allied Corp in 1985. These asset sales are part
of program to reduce debt and concentrate the new firm's assets In desired areas. Stock repurchases: firm
announced that proceeds from asset sales would be used to buyback shares but no additional Information
on number or pflce of shares available.
American Banick Resources / Peabody Coal Company
-3.41 I 870331 (Agreement date)
$12.5/NA
Coal operations / Mining
Not prolitable I 0 1 8K
Over the previous 5 years, this successful firm had grown into one of the largest North American gold
producers, in part through acquisitions. This sale was Its exit from unprolitable coal operations.
American Brands 1 MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc
2.19 I 860725 (Agreement date)
$141 NA
Cigar Co. I NA
Strategic 1 0 I Annual Report
Faced with poor performance in the tobacco market, American Brands was engaged In a program of
diversification and international expansion. The firm sold this tobacco unit as part of this plan.
Amfac Inc. I Borden Inc. and Rabin Brothers
-2.14 / 861112 (D
NA/$20
Fisher Cheese Co. I Diversified food companies
Strategic / 0 / OK
Amfac sold Fisher Cheese Co in an effort to streamline operations and strengthen its finandal position.
Armco Inc. / Kawasaki Steel
1.02 / 890324 (Agreement date)
$350, $109.4
Steel Division I Steel
Joint Venture 1 0 / WSJ, 8K
Kawasald Steel (which had a 40% stake in the sold unit) purchased remaining interest as part of a joint
venture with Armco.
35Artra Group Inc. / VWR Corp.
8.11 I 890808 (DJ)
$25.5 / 416.5
Laboratory Suppty / Photo Supplies
Reduce debt, paydown bank loans Ill Annual Report
The firm sold several unprofitable assets that It had previously purchased as part of an expansion plan.
Baker Hughes Inc I Oy Tampelta AB
-2.25 / 890313 (O%ti)
$130! $0
Mining Equipment I NA
Strategic / 0 / Annual Report
Baker Hughes was formed in 1987 as merger of Baker International and Hughes Tool Co. The sold division
did not fit in with the long-run plans of the new company.
Ball Corporation / TBQ Europe
-5.05 / 870129 (DV
$80 I $8
Glass and Container Manufacturing I JolntVenture
Joint Venture / 0 / WSJ, 8K
The asset sale was a spinoff of Bali's glass container business Into a 50-50 joint venture with a European
firm.
Banner Industries! Diamond Monitors
-1.58! 810331 (DW)
NA/NA
Gas Detection Device Manufacturing / NA
Restructuring to divest operations not meeting growth and profit objectives / 0 / 8K
In early 1987 the firm purchased Rexnord and this sale was part of a program to divest units not meeting
the firm's growth and profit objectives.
R. G. Barry Corp / Jumping-Jack Shoes
2.08 / 850923 (DJ)
$2.3 / -$1
Footwear division I Footwear
Restructuring (strategic) / 0 I Annual report
This asset sale is the last of a series of sales to downslze the firm and turn profits positive. Stock
repurchase: Firm agreed in November 1984 to buy about 10% of its shares from the Streim family for about
$2.3 million.
36Brown Group Inc / Jepson Corporation
-0.98 I 850507 (D
$50 I -$9.3
Recreational Products / NA
Strategic I 0 / Annual report
This asset sale completed Brown Group's strategic withdrawal from the volatile, low-return recreational
products business.
Canal Capital Corn I USIK Acquisition Corporation
-3.37 I 890623 (DJ)
36.875 I $2
Stockyard Business I NA (former insider)
Not profitable (0 / Annual report
The sale of its stockyard operations reflected the fundamental change in the nature of this firm's business
from a stockyard firm to a diversified firm including real estate development, trading securities and Investing
in ancient art.
Champion International Corp / Stone Container
-5.52 / 850930 (OW)
$372.9 / $0
Paperboard mills, corrugated container and bag packaging plants / Paperboard packaging products
Reduce Debt Ill WSJ
This sale was pad of Champion International's restructuring by selling assets to reduce debt incurred when
It acquired St. Regis as a white knight,
Craig Corp I Bercor Inc
-0.05 / 851227 (Agreement date)
$1.61 ISO
Consumer electronics I NA
Cash for acquisitions I 0 / News reports, Annual report
Craig Corn sold assets of its consumer electronics division while at the same time It was developing an
aggressive expansion policy that could lead to Increased debt. Craig was retained as a consultant by the
buyer. Stock repurchases: In October1985, directors authorized repurchase of about $1 million shares. No
evidence that it was carded out.
37Crompton and Knowles (two sales) 1(1) NCH Corp & others (2) Univar Corp
(l)-O.23 (2) -2.14 1(1) 861219 (Agreement date) (2) 881205 (Agreement date)
(1) $14.7 (2) $11 / (1)4.92(2) 4.8
(1) Cleaning subsidiary (2) ChemIcals 1(1) Chemicals (2) Chemicals
(1) StrategIc / 0 F Annual report; (2) Cash for acquisitions (strategic) F 0 / Annual report
These asset sales combined with acquisitions were part of managements strategy for Improving long-term
growth. Stock repurchases: In December 1986, redeemed oR or preferred shares in private transaction for
about $4.5 million. In October1986, bought back 8% of common shares from largest holder. Amount paid
not disclosed.
Crown Central Petroleum I Amoco Corp
-1.97! 871112 (Agreement date)
$166 I $62.7
Oil and gas exploration / Oil and gas
Reduce debt Ill 8K
The company suffered from falling oil prices and sold this asset to reduce debt and to concentrate on
marketing and convenience stores Instead of production.




Strategic (also paid dividend of $45 million) Fl / 8K
As part of its plan to reduce reliance on tobacco Industry. Culbro sold its smokeless tobacco division and
distributed the proceeds to shareholders as a special dividend.
Di Giorgio / Bergen Brunswig Drug Co.
0.00 / 860529 (DJ)
$45 / $8.2
Drug division F Drug distribution
Reduce short-term debt F I / Annual report
To strengthen their balance sheet to support future growth, the firm took several actions to reduce debt
including the sale of this asset and the conversion of debt to equity.
Dlvi Hotels NV / Palmer Group
5.32 / 890824 (D
$62/NA
Hotels I Real estate and hotels
Obtain cash for working capital and to pay down debt / 1! WSJ
The firm sold several hotels after failing to obtain needed working capital in other ways.
38Ducommun Inc/Arrow Electronics Inc
12.68 / 870921 (D
$1241410.5
Electronics distribution I Electronic components
Reduce debt (Arrow Electronics traded $10 million of Ducommun's debt held by Arrow for the asset, paid
$79 milon cash used to reduce bank debt, and the rest made up In Arrow stock distributed to Ducommon
shareholders.) Ill WSJ
Arrow Electronics paid $10 ml Won In Ducommon debt, $79 ml Won In cash and about $35 ml Won worth of
Arrow stock for this asset. Ducommon used the proceeds to lower Its outstanding debt. The finn's
performance had suffered due to slowdown In the semiconductor and space Industries.
EAt Industries / Chromalloy Compressor Technologies
9.041881223 (DJ)
$11.5/41.3
Jet and Tank components manufacturing I NA
Reduce debt and focus on core hardware and related business /11 8K
This finn had several unprofitable years and sold this asset (and several others) to reduce debt and
concentrate on Its core. In addition a group held a more than 10% stake in the firm.
Electrosound Group Inc (two sales) I (1) AudIo Sub Inc (2) Mitsubishi
(1) -7.51 (2) -6.08 /(1) 890310 (DJ) (2) 690626 (DVV)
(1) $2.5 (2) $1.5 1(1) $416 (2) NA
(1) Commercial Dupicating (2) Compact Disk Manufacturing /(1) NA (2) Manufacturing
(1) Strategic (2) Strategic /(1) 0 (2) 0 / (1) Annual report (2) Annual report
The finn sold its convnerical duplicating operation and ended a joint venture with MitsubishI because they
were unprofitable. This enabled them to concentrate on core businesses and reduce debt. Stock
repurchase: In June 1988. Electrosound repurchased $1,080,000 worth of shares from Cinram Ltd. No
evidence of connection to asset sale.
Enviropact Inc I GSX Tank Management
11.83/891023(0,1)
$54141.4
Pump drilling division! NA
Reduce debt, pay taxes and increase working capital Ill Annual report
The firm sold these operations in mid-1989 to reduce debt and return to profitability.
Equitec Financial Group Inc / Hallwood Group Inc.
3.69! 891018 (DJ)
$76.2 I NA
Real Estate Investment PartnershIps / Real Estate
Financial difficulties, need cash/I / Annual report
This financial service firm was hard hIt by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and sold assets as part of an attempt
to avoid bankruptcy.
39Federal Mogul / CMV lnterajneflca Inc
1.60/890109 (OW)
NA I $8.3
Diamond blade manufacturing / Blade manufacturing
Used part of proceeds to repurchase one muon CO{TVflOfl shares and to create an ESOP as a defensive
tactic against possible bidder Nortek Inc. /1/ WSJ
This firm, in response to a threatened hostile takeover, refocused the firm on Its core businesses by selling
this division. It used peit of the proceeds to repurchase I million shares and create an ESOP. Stock
repurchases: The announced defensive repurchase of I million shares would cost about $51 million. In a
standstill aóreement in October. 1989. firm repurctiased $13.3 million shares from Nortek.
First City lndustfles Inc / NB Holdings, subsidiary of Glen Dimplex Ltd.
0.17 / 861009(0W)
$90 1$9.8
Hamilton Beach small appliances / Irish appliance maker
Used to repay debt /1 / OK
First City Industries reduced their long-term debt significantly through the sale of two operating units,
including Hamilton Beach.
John Fluke Mfg Co / N.y. Philips
-0.55 / 870928 (DJ)
NA 1-17.9
Stock in European subsidiary for sale of electronic equipment / Joint venture
Establishing Joint venture 1 0 I BK
This firm and a European firm entered into a Joint venture in which each will sell the others products In their
area. The asset sale consisted of the John Fluke's European sales dMsion. Stock repurchase: In December
1986, the firm bought back about $20 million in stock from the Fluke faSy. In November 1987, the firm
authorized repurchase of about $8 million. No evIdence It was carried out.
General Host Corp (three sales) 1(1) Kraft (2) Management (3) American Salt Acquisition Co. (Mgt)
(1) 13.89 (2) -1.48 (3) 8.61 /(1) 870604 (D (2) 870622 (D (3) 880201 (Agreement date)
(1) $95.8 (2) $39 (3) $31 / (1) $87 (2) $0 (3) $0
(1) Alt American Gourmet Co. (2) Hickory Farms (3) American Salt /(1) Food products (2) Mgmt Group (3)
Mgmt Group
(1) & (2) Reduce long-term debt (3) Cash for litigation settlement 1(1) & (2) & (3)1 / (1) & (2) WSJ (3) 8K
In the early 1980s. General Host began a restructuring away from cyclical dependent industries to focus
on retailing. nurseries and crafts. The proceeds from these asset sales were used to reduce debt and were
part of the continuing restructuflng. Stock repurchases: General Host repurchased about $21 million shares
in a open-market buyback program in 1986. Through 1987 and 1988. firm repurchased about $58.6 million
shares on open market.
40Gleason Corp / Diesel Kiki Co
-5.56 I 890422 (Agreement date)
$16 I$7.725
Differential and gear manufacturing I NA
Strategic, termination of joint venture, selling interest to partner / 0 1 Annual report
This asset sale is part of the firm's exft from a failed diversification effort.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co (two sales) /(1) Local (2) International Paper
(1)2.51(2) 2.171 (1) 870122 (DW) (2) 870413 (DV
(1) $640 (2) $70/(1) NA (2)NA
(1) Aerospace (2) Oil and gas division 1(1) MilItary electronics (2) Paper manufacturing
(1) & (2) Restructuflng, reduce debt IncurS in repurchase of shares / (1) & (2) 0/(1) WSJ (2) 81<
As part a successful defense to a hostile bid, Goodyear sold several assets, refocusing the firm on Its core
tire and rubber business. As part of the defense, the finn repurchased 40 mIllion shares, financing the
repurchase with the sale of all non-tire assets. Stock repurchases: Firm paid approximately $2 billion for
shares repurchased in defensive moves.
Greyhound Corp/investor group
4.92 I 861223 (Dd)
$255 I $30.1
Bus lines / NA
Not profitable / 0 / W&J & Annual report
Greyhound was unable to profitably cope with deregulation In the bus transportation Industry and thus sold
its unprofitable bus lines. Stock repurchases: Firm announced plans to buy back up to 8 mIllion shares
($265 million) In June and September 1986.
Grow Group! Nippon OIl and Fats
1.38/890713(W)
$25.3 /$I5
Paint production assets / Paints and coatings
Reduce debt, general business purposes / 1/ 8K
Grow Group grew in the 1980s through acqtisltions. However, earnings suffered. The asset sale enabled
the firm to report a profit and reduce its high debt level.
Gulf Resources & Chemical Corp / Grace Petroleum
2.62 / 890918 (Agreement date)
$25 / $0.4
Oil and gas / Oil and gas
Cash for working capital and environmental costs and penalties / 1 / Annual report
Gulf Resources 4 Chemical Corp faced environmental cleanup and liability costs. To generate cash, the
firm sold this and other assets.
4tHarnischfeger Corp I Century II • Inc.
3.10/ 880512 (Agreementdate)
$7621559.3
Construction Equipment Manufacturing / Management Buyout
Strategic—soldtoMBO/0/81(
The company decided to discontinue the business of Its construction equipment division and sold the
businesstoa group of former managers.
Helene Curtis Industries Inc I P11 Holdings Company
1.85/851024 (DJ)
$12.51 NA
Sealants and adhesives subsidiary / Newly formed holding company
Strategic / 0 / Annual report
The sale of the sealants subsidiary was consistent with Helene Curtis Inc.'s focus on personal care
products.
Inspiration Resources Corp (2 sales) /(1) Minerco (2) Cyprus Corporation
(1) 7.79 (2) -1.10 / (1) 851203 (DW) (2) 880701 (D,.
(1) NA (2) $125/ (1) -110 (2) $26.7
(1) OIl and gas (2) Copper / (1) MinIng (2) Mining
(I) Restructuring (2) Repay debt (retired all of bank debt) and general business purposes /(1) 0 (2)1 / (I)
61< (2)8K
(1) Given the poor economic conditions In the natural resources lndustiy, the firm divested operations
(purchased only a year earier) and tried to remake the corporation In a way that significantly improved the
prospects for profitability. (2)The finn's attempt to concentrate on agribusiness and away from cyckal
metal resources continued with the sale of Its copper division.
lntermedics / Intermedics Intraocular Acquisition Corp (First Chicago Venture Capital)
-1.84 / 660502 (Agreement date)
$35 / substantial gain
Intraocular lens subsidiary / Venture capital group
Proceeds to pay off debt I I / Annual report
The intraocular lens division was sold to First Chicago Venture Capital.
International Thoroughbred I Greenwood Racing Inc
14.79 / 890630 (Agreement date)
$63 I NA
Racetrack / Race track management - newly formed company
Reduce debt and obtain cash / I / Annual report
This financially troubled firm sold its Philadelphia race track to repay debt and obtain needed cash.
42International Technology Corp (two sales) 1(1) Tenera, LP (2) GSX Chemical Services
(1) 5.18 (2) -12.851(1)881012 (D (2) 890411 (D
(1) NA (2) $84.9 1(1) NA (2) 4110.1
(1) Nuclear risk control (2) treatment and disposal division 1(1) Services to manufacturing (2) chemicals
(1) 6 (2) Strategic (locus on core) 1(1) & (2) 0 1(1) & (2) 81<
(1) The sale of the nuclear risk control group is consistent with the continuing effort of the firm to direct its
resources into the rapidly growing industjial risk assessment sector. (2) The sale was part of the firrns
restructuring program to concentrate on growing subsidarles.
IU International Corp / Paper Corp of America. subsidiary of AJco Standard Corp
5.24/ 860310 (OW)
$32.5 (total cash $106.7 with gain from terminating pension plan) / $21.6 with gain fromterminating
pension plan
Paper distribution operations / Paper company
Broad restructuring and debt reduction effort / 0/ WSJ (Restructuring seems to dominate debtreduction.)
As pail of a broad restructuring effort, It) International sold several operating units, Including this, and the
bulk of Its agribusiness operations end its macademia nut orchards. Over recentyears, the restructuring
has transforrted IU from a complex enterprise serving a multitude of markets Into a simpler and smaller
company focused on a much narrower range of business activity.
K-H Corporation (Fruehaufl I Terex Trailor Corp.
16.11 I890328(D
$231.3/ NA
Trailer manufacturer and shipyard / NA
Pay interest on outstanding debt, repay banks, working capital /1 / WSJ
in 1986. the firm underwent a management buyout. This asset sale was part of theresulting program to
restructure the firm and pay down the debt with asset sales.
Keystone Consobdated Industries / Fastener Five Acquisitions, Inc
-3.08 / 690116 (Agreement date)
$161 $17.6
Metal and plastic crafters I NA
Strategic (focus on the core) / 0 1 Finandal World, Feb 1990
After losing money for most of the 1980s, the company earned $9.3 niilUon in the Ilrst B months of 1989
after extensive restructuring.
43Kollmorgen FPC Acquisition Corp
-3.62 1860930(DW)
$25 / $5
Photodrcults division F Management group
Strategic / 0 / Annual report





Ten different businesses / NA
Lisa cash for acquisition for construction materials and services operations as well as for repurchase of
prefeued stock and common stock F I / Annual report
Koppers announcement of the sale of 10 business units reflected Its plan to reposition the company to
Increase earnings growth rate and raise Its value to shareholders by concentrating on Its construction
materials and services and chemical-based operations. The proceeds were to be used to repurchase the
company's preferred stock and some of Its common shares. Stock repurchases: In June 1988, announced
plans to redeem convertible preference shares for about $46.6 milUon. In December1986, board approved
repurchase of about 15% of common shares for about $135 Slion.
Lee Enterprises md Henry/Benedek Broadcasting
-3.00 / 860904 (D
$13/ $10
Radio station / Broadcasting
Regulation / 0 F 81<
To avoid vIolation of FCC rules against ownership of televIsion and radio stations In the same community.
Lee Enterprises sold its ratio station In Omaha after acquisition of a televisIon station there.
Loral Co/Opus Acquisition Corp
-1.14 / 890328 (Agreement date)
$455 / $5
Aircraft braking division / NA
Strategic/sale of slower growing division and at the same time acquired a growing division. I 0 / Annual
report
The sale of the aircraft braking division was part of the firm's goal of redeploying assets from slowergrowth
to growing core activities, Including growth through acqulsitons. There were allegations of conflicts of
Interest in the sale to the firm's Chairman,
44Morgan's Foods Inc / Midwest Restaurants Concepts
7.58 1890110 (Agreement date)
$1752! -$4013
Sizzler Restaurants I Restaurants
Strategic, not profitable I 0 / 81<
The company sold 11 Sizzler Restaurants that had never achieved projectedsales volume and operated at a loss since their acquisition.
National Intergroup Inc (two sales) 1(1) Norandahl Inc. (2) Werner Co.
(I) -4.50 (2) -6.73 / (1) 890913 (D (2) 891027 (DW
(I) $117.7 (2) $15 I (1) -$16.45 (2)42.5
(1) National aluminum (2) extrusion division 1(1) aluminum (2) NA
(1) & (2) Strategic (concentrate on coi'e) 1(1) S (2)0! (1) & (2) Annualreport
These asset sales were part of the firm's exit from aluminum and steelto concentrate on the core distribution business.
S.E. Nichols Inc. I Schreiber Wholesale Seivices
11.70 /890524 (DJ)
$21 / $3.5
Wbolesale distribution division I Management buyout
Financial difficulties, need to reduce debt! I / S&P ASE Stockreports
Nicflols sakS its F, R. Schreiber Co. subsidiary to agroup of management investors. The proceeds were
to be used to repay its revolving credit Une and for workingcapital.
Nicolet Instrument Corp! AM International
1.41 I 860627 (DW)
$22 / -$9.4
Electronic instrument testing division I NA
Strategic! 0 I Annual report
The firm was unable to operate this division profitably due, inpart, to depressed market conditions, Its sale
was accompanied by restructuring of the remaining product Ines.
Nicor Inc. / Adcor Drilling Inc.
-0.29 / 860902 (OW)
NA / NA
Drilling division / Management buyout
Reduce debt through restructuring I I I Annualreport
Alter two years of sizable losses, the firm returned toprofitability by divesting several unprofitable units,
including this drilling division. The proceeds were used to reduce debt
45Nortek Inc I Duro Industries Inc
-6.71 / 851230 (Agreement date)
$20 I $6
Textile processing / Management buyout
Strategic / 0 / Annual report
Although the textile processing division remained viable, the firm concluded that it no longer fit into Nortek's
long-term plans due to foreign competition and low growth prospects.
O'Sullivan Corp / Vulcan Corp. Jones and Vining
-3.31 I 860604 (Agreement date)
NA / $0.15
Rubber heel and sole operations / Footwear
Strategic / 0 / Annual report
O'Sullivan Corp decided to get out of the rubber business and concentrate on Its core businesses of vinyl
sheeting and Injection molding.
Portec I Harsco
-3.91 / 890206 (0.1)
$9.1/NA
Railway maintenance products / Steel/metal works
Cut bank debt (in default) / 1/ 8K
The firm sold Its railway maintenance products division and used the proceeds to repay Its outstanding bank
debt. The firm had been In default with Its creditors until a debt restructuflng In August 1988.
Primark Corp / C. Itoh and Co. Inc
8.51 I 880921 (0V
$37.9 / NA
TV leasing company/ NA
Cash for pending takeover / 0 I WSJ
Primark sold its Telerent Leasing Corporation (providing TV leasing to the lodging Industry).
Professional Care Inc (two sales) /(1) Tender Loving Care Health ServIce (2) Olsten Corporation
(1) -35.02 (2) -3.41 1(l) 870901 (0.1) (2) 880722 (0.1)
(1) $3 (2) $2.4 /(1) $.3 (2) $67
(1) Offices (2) Offices 1(1) Health care (2) Temporary services
(1) & (2) Cash for litigation settlement in medicaid fraud cash 1(1) & (2) 11(1) & (2) 8K
The firm had several years of financial difficulties due to ctvll and criminal litigation charging medicaid fraud.
These sales were part of an asset sale program used to pay litigation expenses and penalties.
46Punta Gorda Isles Inc I Village Builders of Floflda
17.65 / 851019 (Agreement date)
$23 / NA
Real estate / Real estate
Repay debt and financial difficulties / 1 I BK
Weak real estate conditions and a heavy debt burden had resulted in poor performance for this company
since 1981. The proceeds from the sale of this marina project were used to further reduce Its debt.
Quantum Chemical Corporation / Henkel CorpOration
19.32 I 881228 (D
$480 I $16.8
Oleochemicals business I NA
Cash to repay bank loan used to pay dividend/i I WSJ
This asset sale was part of the finn's unusual recapitalization In late 1988. The firm used the proceeds from
the asset sale and a debt Issuance to repay a bank loan used to pay shareholders a $50 dividend and
maintain the ability to continue their acquisition program. Stock repurchase: On 880308, firm announced
o stock buyback plan valued at $246 to $273 million.
Savin Corp / Scriptex Enterprises
4.82/870113 (Di)
NAI$1.9
New York and Long Island retail branches I Retailer
Strategic (focus on the core) and streamline operations / 0 / Annual report
This asset sale is part of the firm's program to streamline operations, focus on the core, Increase efficiency
and lower its breakeven point. The firm had restructured its debt to get out of default in the previous yew.
Service Resources Corp (two sales) /(1) U.S. Banknote Company (2) Thomas L. DePetrillo
(1)4.94(2) i3.14/(1)880829(D(2)8904Q6(DJ)
(1) $7.6 (2) $3.21 (1) 419.1 (2) 2.036
(1) Financial printing company (2) Keyboard manufacturing 1(1) Financial printing (2) Management buyout
(1) & (2) Financial difficulties & pay down debt 1(1) & (2) 1/(1) WSJ (2)8K
This financially troubled firm (in default on Interest payments since 1987) sold these assets In an attempt
to remain solvent.
Slerracin Corp / Valor Electronics Inc
7.12 / 860607 (Agreement date)
$2.3 / $0
Power systems division / Electronics
Strategic / 0 1 Annual report
The firm sold this asset to concentrate on growth-oflented businesses and core technologies.
47Talley Industries Inc / TRW
-18.93 1 890206 (D
$85 /$37.5
Air bag division / Industrial
Cash earmarked to repay debt /11 WSJ
The sale of the air bag division culminated the bun's two-year restructuring program of divestments and
acquisitions.
Tandy Brands Inc (2 sales) 1(1) Action Inc and D. Motsenbocker (2) Grate Home and Fireplace Co
(1) -2.47 (2) 12.20/(1) 860410 (DJ) (2) 870304 (DM
(1) $3 (2) $1.61 (1) -$0.68 (2) -$9.3
(1) Western leather division (2) Grate and fireplace dIvision 1(1) NA (2) Home suppes
(1) & (2) Strategic /(1) & (2) 01(1) & (2) Annual repoit
These sales were part of the company's restructuring program designed to enable the firm to concentrate
resources on Its remaining rapidly growing speclaity retaling division.
Morton Thiokol I Dow Chemicais
-11.86 /841115 (OW)
$131 I $75.1
Household cleaner division I Chemicals
Strategic (focus on th. core) I 0 I Annual report & WSJ
The sale of the household cleaning division to Dow Chemical for cash and the shares of the firm held by
Dow helped the firm concentrate on its other businesses and served as an antitakeover device against Dow
(the sale was accompanied by a 10-year standstill agreement).
Total Petroleum Ltd / Various buyers
2.98 / 690104 (OW)
$152 I $2
Oil and gas/NA
Strategic / 0 I Annual report
The oil and gas operations in the U.S. did not offer sufficient prospects for future profitability.
Tuidex Corp / Jordan Industries Inc
8.05 I 890803 (OJ)
$9.9 / NA
Radio coaxial connectors division / NA
Redeem notes, working capital and acquisitions /1 1 WSJ
The firm used the proceeds to to pay In full Its outstanding indebtedness of $6.7 ml Won to Heller Financial
and terminated its credit facilities with Keller.
48Tribune Co / Cooke MediaCorporation
1.66/851210(0W)
$176 /$176.7
LA Daily News (newspapers) I Communications
Retire debt /1/ WSJ
The proceeds from this sale plus the sale of (our cable systems were used to retire debt which had been
Incurred in the acquisition of a Los Angeles TV station.
Union Carbide Corp / Ralston Purina
4.86 / 860407 (OW)
$1415 /$304
Battery products division I Diversified company
Proceeds over the book value of assets were distributed to shareholders as special dividend (about $33.20
per share) / I / WSJ
These asset sales were part of Union Carbide's restructuring as a defense to a hostile bid from GAF. In
the restructuring, the firm repurchased 56% of Its shares (or cash and debt end paid a large cash dividend
to shareholders. Stock repurcflases: To ward off GAP, paid out $774.6 million in cash plus about $2.6 billion
in debt for 56% of shares. Also paid out proceeds from sale of unit to shareholders as special dividend.
United Inns Inc I Hanna Car Wash
-0.84 /880812 (W)
$17/ $2.2
Car wash business / Car wash
Not profitable I 0 I Annual report
This firm sold Its unprofitable discontinued car wash division.
US Shoe Corp (3 sales) 1(1) Edison Brothers Apparel Stores (2) Freeman Shoe Co (3) Linen Supermarket
(1) 1.31 (2)0.55(3)0.38/(1) 870429 (OW) (2) 870511 (Agreement date) (3) 870609 (Agreement date)
(1) $44 (2) $41 (3) $4.6 I $7 on all three combined
(1) '.1 Riggings (retailing) (2) Mens Shoe Division (3) Home Front Division / (1) Shoes (2) Shoes (3) Home
products
(1), (2) & (3) Strategic /(1), (2) & (3)0 / (1). (2), & (3) Annual report
US Shoe sold a chain of apparel stores, its home products division and its mens shoe division to fund
expansion of specialty retailing and optical retailing, as well as selective footwear opportunities.
49Varo Inc. / Veto Quality Semiconductor Inc
-0.30 I 851224 (D
$14.8 / 42.2
Semiconductors / Management group
Unproiltable division — proceeds earmarked to repay $7 million of short-term debt with remainder for
working capital purposes/i / S&P Stock reports
Varo sold its unprolitable semiconductor manufacturing subsididary and earmarked the funds to repay debt.
Stock repurchases: Firm authorized repurchase of about $1 million of common stock on open market.
Vennont Research Corp / Miltope
-7.02/850919 (D
52.85 I $1.5
Disk drive manufacturing / Computer
Unprofitable division / 0/ SaP ME stock reports
Disappointing sales of a new disk drive led to the sale of e disk drive production facility and related
technology.
Wemer Communications Inc / American Protection lndustAes, Inc
0.37 / 841213 (DW)
5162/ NA
Franklin Mint (Collectible manufacturing) /Newly formed partnership-Warner Communications retains stake
Strategic - build upon continuJng operations and improve balance sheet / 0 / Annual report
Warner Communications sold several businesses reduce corporate overhead and refocus attention on Its
core businesses. Stock repurcflases: Announcement on 840319 that lirm would buy back Rubert Murdoch's
News Corp.'s shares for $180.6 million, ending IS-week struggle for company.
Warner-t.ambert Co (three sales) 1(1) Becton Dickinson & Co. (2) Cambridge Instrument Co (3) Henley
Group Inc
(1) 1.47 (2) 5.61 (3) -2.45, (I) 860306 (OW) (2)860326(0.0 (3) 860425 (OW)
(1) 5225 (2) $50 (3) $163.5 / -$497 on all three combined
(1) Hospital products division (2) ScIentific Instruments dIvision (3) Irned / (1) Health care (2) NA (3) NA
(1), (2), & (3) Restructuring to focus on the core / (1), (2), & (3) 0 I (1). (2), & (3) 81<
As part of a review of operations and the changing business environment in thehospital supply Industry,
Warner-Lantert made the decision to write down and divest certain of Its operations and to restructure and
consolidate others. Stock repurchases: WSJ reports on 851129 that firm plans to buy back 8 million shares.
for about $352 million.
50Westinghouse Electric Corp I Group of 5 telecommunications companies
-1.51 / 851223 (D
$1700! $500
Cable company / Telecommunications
Restructuring I 0 I BK
This sale is part of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's restructuring program designed to promote growth
as the leading participant in several markets. Stock repurchases: By March 1986. firm had repurchased
about 21 milon shares for about $887.25 million.
51